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ABSTRACT
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the demise of the
former Soviet Union, the promotion of global democracy and
free markets along with the principles of human rights have
become paramount to U.S. interests and foreign policy. The
significance of attaining global democracy has been fueled by
the proposal that liberal states do not go to war with other
liberal states which in the post-Cold War environment suggests
a correlation between democracy and world peace.
This thesis will support the hypothesis, using Tunisia as
an example, that U.S. foreign policy for global
democratization will elicit the use of democracy as a window
dressing in order for a country to foster and enhance foreign
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In the post Cold War environment the four basic concepts
of security, bipolarity, bipolar rivalry and superpower
alliances no longer completely define U.S. international
relations and external issues. The previous alliance system
to support superpower objectives has been replaced by the
factors of global economic competition where the dollar has
become the basis for all transactions and political stability
has become the attraction of international investment.
Democratic declarations are viewed as a means by which
political stability can be assured. However, such
declarations are not necessarily reflective of the actual
practices within a country.
Economically, Tunisia is as dependent on Europe as Mexico
is on the U.S. Tunisia's high level of unemployment, lack of
education and although not a direct factor, high ratio of
imports has contributed to Tunisia's dependence on European
and Western trade and investment which is paramount to the
country's livelihood. Both Huntington and Rueschemeyer
propose that economic democracy or a market economy are the
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most promising means to achieve formal democracy. Although
free markets are perceived to foster democracy, democracy is
a political system rather than a social and economic system.
Economic growth alone, as suggested by Huntington, will not
lead to the success of democracy.
Tunisia cannot risk a perception from the U.S. or Europe
that it is an unreliable ally which would break the confidence
barrier needed to foster foreign investment. President Ben
Ali, having personally experienced the challenges of Bourguiba
as Minister of Interior, elected to gamble on the
proclamations of democracy to legitimize his rule and to
foster foreign investment and economic aid. This proclamation
of democracy would give an illusion of political stability and
a means by which his regime can survive and foster legitimacy
and thereby not allow an economic crisis to be an opening for
a revived Islamic movement and governmental overthrow as was
the case of Bourguiba. In other words, a healthy growing
economy would in essence reduce the appeal of extremist
Islamic movements which would challenge the government.
Every political system rests on a culture system and every
culture system rests on that society's experiences and values.
It is the people themselves who will determine whether
viii
democratic systems will be established and whether they will
survive. Tunisia's importance to the U.S. is that of
political stability. Tunisia does represent a unique
opportunity for the creation of a democratic Islamic
government should Ben Ali recognize that democracy is a
political mechanism to foster government accountability and
individual rights rather than representative of participation
in collective enterprises. Although the recent political
unrest of the Islamic movement in Algeria makes this
possibility all the more unlikely, movement on a true
democratic path regardless of economic progress will not occur
until such political factors are addressed.
In the post Cold War environment where the issue of human
rights has become a U.S. interest, perhaps the emphasis of
U.S. foreign policy should be that of good governmental
practices which recognize individual freedoms rather than
democratic reform. This in turn would preclude the use of
democracy as window dressing, project clear U.S. policy
intentions and deter the perception of Western imperialism.
ix
I. INTRODUCTION
During the Cold War the four basic concepts of security,
bipolarity, bipolar rivalry and superpower alliances defined
U.S. international relations and external issues. Military
capability was dominate at the center of international
security issues motivated primarily by U.S. global economic
initiatives. World order was based on bipolarity and
consequently the international environment was defined by the
existence of and relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet
Union. Along with bipolarity was the ideological rivalry
between democracy and capitalism on the one hand and
totalitarian politics and command economics on the other.
With such rivalry came an alliance system to support each
superpowers objectives such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The
goals of the alliance system were simple in that each
superpower sought to align as many countries as possible
regardless of a country's government system or practices. The
main objective, from the U.S. standpoint, was the containment
of communism. [Ref 1, pg. 3]
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Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and demise of the former
Soviet Union, democracy and capitalism have surfaced as the
"winning" ideological dimension and as a result, global
constitutional democracy with the key elements of human rights
and respect for minority rights is being viewed, in many
circles, as the only legitimate form of government. The
significance of democracy as the only legitimate form of
government has been fueled by the proposals of Immanuel Kant
and Michael Doyle who argue that liberal states do not go to
war with other liberal states which in the post-Cold War
environment suggests a correlation between democracy and world
peace. [Ref 2, pp. 65-67] The seriousness of global
democratization is reflective in President Clinton's
announcement to nominate Morton Halperin as the assistant
secretary of defense for democracy and human rights. This
position however which was never filled, was abolished by
Defense Secretary William Perry during his efforts to reshape
the bureaucracy. The issue of humanitarian responsibilities
was shifted to that of assistant secretary Holmes under
special operations and low intensity conflict. (Ref 3]
The demise of the former Soviet Union has also caused a
shift in U.S. interests and foreign policy which is being
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shaped by an external environment driven by economics. As the
Cold War alliance system supported bipolar military
superpowers, the new world order suggests the possibility of
major multipolar economic rivalries. To this end and having
proven its military superiority on a global level, the U.S.
surfaces as a country retaining the Cold War ideology of
democracy and capitalism that is seeking economic alliances to
retain the title of a global superpower. The linkage
therefore between democracy, capitalism and international
trade and investment has become the centerpiece of U.S.
interests, foreign policy and alliances.
The molding of this new world order alliance however
creates conflict between the triad objectives of U.S.
interests and foreign policy by countries which are dependent
on an alliance with the U.S. such as third world countries.
This thesis will argue, using Tunisia as an example, that U.S.
foreign policy for global democratization will elicit the use
of democracy as a window dressing in order for a country to
foster and enhance foreign investment. As a resource poor
Muslim country, Tunisia is dependent on foreign investment for
its livelihood which therefore solicits proclamations of
democracy when in fact there are major differences between the
3
democracy that is proclaimed and governmental practices that
are occurring. This is not to imply that the intent of
President Ben Ali's proclamations of democracy are not to
eventually achieve democratic reform but rather to suggest
that true democracy implies the distribution of power and
recognition of individual freedoms including governmental
opposition as well as the recognition of human rights.
Perhaps, in keeping with the right of self-determination,
emphasis should be placed on "good" government practices




Democracy is viewed as a mechanism through which
governments can respect the dignity of the individual and meet
the needs of prosperity, the need of national identity and the
need for politics that generate legitimacy and authority to
cope with the fundamental social and technological changes
[Ref 4, pg. 2061.
Samuel P. Huntington defines democracy to mean a political
system in which the:
... most powerful collective decision-makers are
selected through periodic elections in which
candidates freely compete for votes and in which
virtually all the adult population is eligible to
vote. (Ref. 5, pg. 195]
Dietrich Rueschemeyer proposes that democracy is "above
all a matter of power" [Ref. 6, pg. 51. He defines democracy
in terms of the state's responsibility to the parliament. To
this end he proposes that the three dimensions to the concept
of democracy are:
... regular, free and fair elections of
representatives with universal and equal suffrage,
second, responsibility of the state apparatus to the
5
elected parliament.. .and third, the freedoms of
expression and association as well as the protection
of individual rights against arbitrary state action.
(Ref 6, pg. 431
Bruce Russett defines democracy as "a set of institutions
and norm for peaceful resolution of conflict" [Ref. 7, pg.
1241. To this end, Zartman suggests that democracy contains
two elements to prevent conflict. Democracy:
... 1) elects officials according to the interests
and demands of the citizenry at any given time, so
that current issues are on the table and the governors
are chosen in the light of their apparent competence
and concern for these issues; and 2) it holds those
governors responsible for living up to their promises
and therefore accountable in case of weakness. [Ref
8, pg 327]
Robert Dahl envisions democracy in terms of polyarchy: a
political system where there is extensive competition among
individuals and organized groups and a high level of political
participation and where there is a meaningful level of civil
and political liberties. To this end, democracy requires two
elements - that of contestation and participation. (Ref 9,
pp. 1-211
As the world's premier democratic country, the concept of
global democratization has fostered numerous misconceptions
and elicited numerous classifications. Democracy is an ideal
that is supported by governmental institutions and a political
6
system rather than an economic or social system. Democracy is
not a set of complex formulas for governance and political
participation but rather a set of processes and social forces
that culminate into individual freedoms and choices. It is a
political system which assumes the separation of church and
state and as a result conflicts with world-wide applicability
particularly with an Islamic state where the Quran is the
constitution and the Shari'a is the legal system. Huntington
states that the extent to which political systems are
democratic can be determined by whether or not a political
system denies voting participation to part of its society. If
a political system does not practice universal suffrage, it is
considered to be undemocratic. [Ref 10, pg. 7]
Malcolm Churchill states:
... the ballot box has come to stand as the symbol
of democracy for people around the world. Americans
are among those who accept this symbol and who have
encouraged its spread. Regrettably, preoccupation
with the act of voting has diverted attention from the
institutional dynamics of the divergent governing
processes encompassed in the term democracy. [Ref 11,
pg. 1113
The classification of democracy into categories such as
radical, guided, liberal, socialist and consociational
democracy to name a few, has allowed authoritarian regimes,
7
dictatorships and other forms of non-democratic governments to
continue to exist under new titles in order to be politically
correct in the new world order and mask their practices.
Robert Pinkney states that:
The classification of democracies is as old as
political science itself, and we have an embarrassment
of typologies to offer the aspiring Third World
Country. [Ref 12, pg. 5]
B. DEVELOPNENT OF DEMOCRACY
Every political system rests on a culture system and every
culture system rests on that societies experiences and values.
Accordingly, it is the people themselves who will determine
whether democratic systems will be established and whether
they will survive. Our principles of democracy make sense to
us however these same principles are not necessarily
applicable to other countries.
Early theorists on the development of Western democracy
such as Barrington Moore suggest that the two conditions
necessary for the development of democracy were 1) the
development of a balance of power to avoid too strong a crown
or too independent a landed aristocracy and, 2) a turn toward
an appropriate form of agriculture either by the peasantry or
by the landed aristocracy rRef 13, pp. 430-431].
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As to the development of democracy today, Dankwart Rustow
identifies the key elements of democracy as the free flow of
information and expression; competitive parties and electoral
approval; equal representation; control of governmental
representatives and periodic changes in the composition of the
governing. [Ref 14, pg. 94) Rueschemeyer on the other hand
states that:
... it is power relations that most importantly
determine whether democracy can emerge, stabilize, and
then maintain itself even in the face of adverse
conditions. [Ref 6, pg. 5]
Rueschemeyer, focusing on the power and balance of the
class structures proposes three conditions which shape the
development of democracy. Class power, as the first
condition, according to Rueschemeyer is related to the density
of civil society. Civil society in this sense is comprised of
social institutions and associations that are not governmental
nor production related which strengthen the organizational
capabilities of the working and middle classes. This class of
power then acts as a counter balance to state power which is
significant to the development of democracy. [Ref 6, pp. 6-
7] If democracy is compatible with the Middle East, perhaps
it may be of benefit to reevaluate Islamic fundamentalism as
9
a vehicle to promote democracy rather than to view these
movements as aggression and terrorism. Mansour Farhang
states:
There is a significant middle class with a modern
education and a secular political orientation in every
Middle Eastern country. Many members of this class
are at the forefront of the struggle for political and
economic reform, but they have yet to develop the
capacity to build functional alliances with the urban
poor or lower-middle classes. (Ref 15, pg. 31
The second condition proposed by Rueschemeyer is the
relationship of the state apparatus to other concentrations of
power in society. The state is not only the structure from
which enforcement and implementation is accomplished but is
often times the area where "binding collective decisions" are
arrived at. The states ability to act with other power
concentrations then is relative to the development of
democracy. The third condition is the interaction of external
actors to the country. In this respect, Rueschemeyer is
referring to the external economic and political interests
that transcend borders and which enter into the balance of
power within a country affecting the development of democracy.
(Ref. 6, pp. 6-7]
Rueschemeyer also addresses the relationship between
capitalism and democracy stating:
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... capitalist development is associated with
democracy because it transforms the class structure,
strengthening the working and middle classes and
weakening the landed upper class. It was not the
capitalist market nor capitalists as the new dominant
force, but rather the contradictions of capitalism
that advanced the cause of democracy. [Ref. 6, pg. 7]
Samuel Huntington on the other hand, identifies several
preconditions for democracy of which a market economy is the
only precondition that is an absolute. These preconditions
include:
... higher levels of economic well-being; the
absence of extreme inequalities in wealth and income;
greater social pluralism, including particularly a
strong and autonomous bourgeoisie; a more market-
oriented economy; greater influence vis-a-vis the
society of existing democratic states; and a culture
that is less monistic and more tolerant of diversity
and compromise. [Ref 5, pg 214]
C. CRITERIA FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORM
Dahl points out that many of the present democratic
regimes were instituted either as countries became independent
from foreign rule or instituted during the periods of foreign
rule [Ref 9, pg. 197]. With reference to the Middle East
however, the implants of Western democracy did not take root
and can be attributed to either the imperialistic notions
associated with colonialism, the unwillingness to distribute
power or simply that any change from an existing government
11
must be wanted before it can be achieved. Huntington states
that "democracies are created not by causes but by causers"
[Ref 10, pg. 107].
Huntington suggests four causes that foster transitions to
democracy and three ways in which to effect the transition to
democracy. The first cause suggested to foster a transition
to democracy is an increase in economic conditions. This
increase is anticipated to lead not only to higher levels of
education and literacy but to the development of a larger
middle class which in turn would foster the development of
attitudes and values which would support democracy. The
second cause is a more involved and aggressive role of the
leadership of the Catholic Church to oppose authoritarian
regimes, strengthen civil society and support efforts for
democracy. In support of this cause, Huntington quotes Pope
John Paul II who refers to the church as the guardian of
freedom, human rights and democracy. Huntington's third cause
refers to the role of external actors such as the U.S. and the
European Community whose policies support democratic
development. Lastly Huntington attributes the media, the
ability of television and other means of communications, who
transmit the downfall of countries such as the former Soviet
12
Union and which in turn strengthens moves toward democracy in
other countries. [Ref 10, pp. 59-106]
The three means suggested by Huntington to effect a
transition to democracy are 1) initiatives taken by reformers
within an authoritarian regime who believe that a transition
to democracy is needed and desired, 2) the overthrow of
authoritarian regimes and, 3) negotiations or compromise
between reformers and authoritarian regimes for democratic
change. [Ref 10, pp. 124-163] Farhang states that:
... Islamic fundamentalists represent the best
organized challengers of the entrenched ruling elite.
Their ability to articulate popular discontent in the
form of religious and cultural idioms has a powerful
appeal to the populace. [Ref 15, pg. 3]
Rueschemeyer on the other hand, simply put, states that
"economic democracy" is the most promising avenue to achieve
formal democracy. By reducing social and economic inequality
and allowing private ownership over the means of production,
an "institutional separation of the economy from the polity"
would be achieved. The criteria for a successful democracy in
other words, is based overall on the distribution of power.
(Ref 6, pp. 41-3001
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D. OBSTACLES TO DUIOCRACY
1. Economic Growth
Rueschemeyer has argued that "economic democracy" is
the most promising means to achieve formal democracy.
Huntington suggests on one hand that a market economy is an
absolute precondition to democracy but on the other hand
suggests that economic growth alone has also lead to the
failure of democracy. To this end, he states that in
situations where economic growth alone has occurred:
The leading roles have been played by the state
and by multinational enterprises. As a result,
economic development runs ahead of the development of
a bourgeoisie. [Ref 5, pg. 2041
Accordingly, it seems apparent that the development of
an autonomous, indigenous bourgeoisie which limits state power
along with economic growth is a prerequisite to the transition
to democracy. Perhaps democracy that is not linked to
capitalism will not succeed because democracy also implies the
freedom to take risks which is fundamental to a capitalistic
society.
2. Contestation
In the Middle East and North Africa, the concept of
democracy is understood to be that of participation in a
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collective enterprise rather than a political mechanism to
foster government accountability or guarantee individual
rights [Ref 16, pg 260]. Contestation appears to be one of
the major barriers to democracy in the Middle East. Lisa
Anderson suggests that the difficulty of contestation may be
attributed to either the:
... strong egalitarian traditions of Islamic
political theory, to the imperatives of the
nationalist struggle against European imperialism or
to the demands of nation-building and the creation of
citizenship after independence. [Ref 16, pg 259]
3. Political Culture
Political culture can be said to be the product of the
culture content of a particular country. As previously
addressed, Rueschemeyer maintains that power relations, the
interaction of power sources and interests, determine the
success of democracy. It can then be assumed that political
culture, which is rooted in the culture of society involving
beliefs, values and relations between members is a major
determinant of the power sources and their interests.
Policies therefore are a product of a country's culture.
Huntington states that:
A political culture that values highly
hierarchical relationships and extreme deference to
authority presumably is less fertile ground for
15
democracy than one that does not. Similarly, a
culture in which there is a high degree of mutual
trust among members of the society is likely to be
more favorable to democracy than one in which
interpersonal relationships are more generally
characterized by suspicion, hostility, and distrust.
A willingness to tolerate diversity and conflict among
groups and to recognize the legitimacy of compromise
also should be helpful to democratic development.
(Ref 5, pg. 2091
In essence, the nature of democracy is a co-
partnership among equals that can only function through
compromise. The main objective of political culture as an
obstacle to democracy is that societies with a political
culture where national unity is lacking and power is hoarded
rather than used to accommodate are more resistant to the
development of a democratic political culture. Democracy
therefore is perceived as a threat. Simply put, democracy
requires an open mindedness of the society to foster an
ability to accept change, a society which recognizes
inequality as a law of nature and a government that is willing
to invest power in the people and recognize and accept
individuals and opposition into the decision making process.
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4. Desirability
Under any conditions, before democratization can
proceed, first and foremost is the desire for true democratic
reform. Referring to the development and criteria for
democratic reform as previously addressed, the overthrow of
authoritarian regimes, the distribution of power, economic
growth that fosters an autonomous, indigenous bourgeoisie,
limitations to state power, privatization of the economy and
the recognition of individual rights can only be accomplished
when a society willingly accepts a democratic concept.
Without such a commitment, situations such as recently
experienced by Algeria where it appears that eieryone was for
democratic reform provided the government was assured victory
or that of Iraq where Saddam Hussein is still in power, no
transition will occur.
For the purposes of this thesis, the theories of
Huntington and Rueschemeyer as previously addressed will be
used as criteria for the evaluation of Tunisia in support of
the hypothesis that democratic reform can be used as window
dressing in order to foster and enhance foreign investment
rather than to move toward democratic reform.
17
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TUNISIA
A. BOURGUIBA
Like Nasser of Egypt and Idris of Libya, Bourguiba sought
to rid Tunisia of feudalism and foreign control. A highly
nationalistic individual, Bourguiba who had been imprisoned on
several occasions due to his anti-colonial aggression found
the Neo-Destour Party as his vehicle to liberation. The Neo-
Destour Party, originally formed by Dr. Mahmoud Materi as
president and Habib Bourguiba as secretary general, emerged as
a separate organization from the nationalistic Destour Party
in 1934 as a result of unreconcilable differences within the
Party on how to free Tunisia from French colonial rule. Final
separation of the Neo-Destour Party from the Destour Party
however did not occur until 1937. While Materi is said to
have given the party dignity and prestige, it was Bourguiba
who formulated the party's program and ideas insisting that
only constant and persistent pressure could make France
release Tunisia. [Ref, 17, pg. 119] The Neo-Destourian Party
was reportedly:
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... committed to the struggle in the street to
obtain the independence of Tunisia by opposing French
imperialism and colonization which was responsible for
the misery into which the country is plunged. [Ref
17, pg. 120]
Due to the withdrawal of Dr. Materi from the Neo-
Destourian party, the exile of Moncef Bey, the Tunisian
monarch who was accused of collaborating with the Axis Powers
during the occupation of World War II and the death of the Old
Destour party leader, Bourguiba became the undisputed leader
of the nationalist cause. [Ref 17, pp. 121-1261 Bourguiba
realized that the Islamic personality of Tunisia was
entrenched in society and he used Islam as a legitimizing
factor for the mobilization of the masses which allowed him to
harness the support of the population and bring the country to
independence in 1956. Lisa Anderson writes: "among the few
things that virtually all Tunisians shared was Islam" [Ref
18, pg. 175]. To this end, Bourguiba offered himself to
Tunisia as a "modernist reformer of Islam." [Ref 19, pg. 5921
After independence however Bourguiba's focus on Islam
faded. Bourguiba's main objective was to eliminate
underdevelopment in Tunisia and in doing so his political
posture of internal and external manipulation began to unfold
creating a history of dependency on the West and Europe for
19
the country's livelihood. Bourguiba was said to take a
"logical and dispassionate view of all issues"
implementing a strategy of "advancing step by step from one
prepared position to another" which was coined 'Bourguibisme'.
[Ref 20, pg. 4871
Bourguiba viewed the world as being divided into three
spheres; the West, the East and the Arab region. He saw the
United States as a liberal country which was reconstructing an
autonomous Western Europe. He saw the Soviet Union as a
totalitarian country struggling for survival and he "snubbed"
the Arab region as being "hopelessly poor, backward, and
politically misguided." [Ref 21, pg. 116] As a result
Bourguiba considered the West, including France, as the
vehicle to meet his internal objectives and consequently
instituted political institutions and a foreign policy which
focused on liberal modernization. Bourguiba, in 1957, stated:
We are orienting ourselves toward a regime which
assures a minimum of stability at the head of the
state. It is for this reason that we prefer to go
toward an American regime, but our constitution will
not be a copy of the American Constitution. [Ref 17,
pg. 190]
From the U.S. standpoint, Bourguiba provided the political
quality desired to contain the advance of communism and to
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quell anti-American sentiments in North Africa (Ref 21, pg.
116]. To this end Bourguiba, inspired to achieve involvement
with the West and to maintain a good standing, took a moderate
stance toward Middle East issues which often defied the
political aspirations of the region. Bourguiba saw pan-
Arabism as an impractical policy. He was also among the first
to suggest that peace should be made between the Arab world
and Israel as a solution to the Palestinian question [Ref
22).
Bourguiba's strategy was somewhat successful as during the
period 1957-1963 Tunisia received aid in the form of loans,
grants and food from the U.S. in an amount which exceeded $350
million and which equalled approximately $12 per year for
every Tunisian. Additionally, grants and loans from other
countries accounted for 50 percent of the Tunisian capital
budget. [Ref 17, pg. 2091
B. POLITICAL CONTENT
The Tunisian Constitution according to Vandewalle is:
based on liberal principles that centralized
political and governmental activities and of a
political ideology that encouraged the secularization
of daily life. [Ref 23, pg. 604]
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The Tunisian Constitution under Bourguiba did contain some
provisions which suggest democratic ideals such as the
establishment of executive and legislative powers that would
be independent yet equally powerful [Ref 17, pg. 1891. But
in practice the Tunisian constitution seems to have been a
paper constitution which enabled Bourguiba and his party, the
Parti Socialiste Destourien (PSD), to gain control of the
country in che name of liberal modernization. Addressing the
characteristics of the Tunisian constitution George Sfeir
writes:
In the new states of Asia and Africa which have
adopted modern constitutions, one finds the letter of
the constitution providing ample securities of
individual rights, whereas in the body politic these
rights and securities are in fact still being striven
for, and the institutions groping for roots. It
represents an anomalous situation in which constitu-
tional forms often exist side by side with arbitrary
rule, a situation often inviting resort to extra-legal
acts in order, truly or allegedly, to reassert
constitutional rights and promote more liberal
institutions. [Ref 24, pg. 446]
Clement Moore describes Tunisia under Bourguiba as a
"modern administrative dictatorship" where the PSD party
elites dominated virtually all aspects of social and political
life in Tunisia [Ref 25, pg. 1081. Because of Bourguiba's
justified dictatorship one is tempted to view his reforms for
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liberalized modernization as measures to crush any opposition;
mainly the religious authorities as will be addressed.
C. SECULAR MODERNIZATION
To further his objective against underdevelopment and to
advance secular modernization, Bourguiba and the PSD attempted
to radically restructure the role of Islam in Tunisia through
several reforms.
Bourguiba launched, through American and French aid
programs, an ambitious educational program as a means to
overcome a 72 percent illiteracy rate. This program however,
in effect alienated the role of the ulema in Tunisian society
[Ref 17, pg. 219]. The educational program had two
objectives: that of the enrollment of all children in primary
school and the unification of the education system. As a
result, religious schools were eliminated through integration
and religious education, which was controlled by the state,
was drastically reduced. [Ref 19, pg. 592]
The Personal Status Code of 1956 was aimed at improving
women's social conditions by reforming laws governing divorce
and marriage as well as outlawing the wearing of the hijab in
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the classroom and elsewhere (Ref 19, pg. 5931. Bourguiba
reportedly stated:
If we understand... that the middle-aged women are
reticent about abandoning a old habit we can only
deplore the stubbornness of parents who continue to
oblige their children to wear a veil in school. We
even see civil servants going to work in that odious
rag. It has nothing to do with religion. [Ref 19,
pg. 593]
Believing that the observation of Ramadan hindered
economic development, in 1960 Bourguiba reportedly argued
that:
... the struggle against underdevelopment was so
important that it was a modern form of holy war or
jihad and therefore should take precedence over
fasting, which made people sluggish and unable to work
to capacity.. .the economic crisis warranted Qur'anic
exceptions on fasting... In order for Africa to attain
the level of power, of culture and prosperity of
Europe or America, it is necessary for you to work, to
conquer apprehensions, superstitions and social
constraint. [Ref 17, pp. 212-213]
In many respects however Bourguiba's secular modernization
efforts promoted an image of himself as being anti-Islamic and
pro-Western. Bourguiba realized that in order to build a
strong economy with limited resources, a reliance on
assistance from other nations was required. While economic
conditions temporarily improved due largely to Bourguiba's
foreign policies, the Tunisian population was politically
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unorganized and although offended by his assault on Islamic
institutions, accepted his efforts for reform until 1961 when
demonstrations acquired a violent tone and lead to his
eventual removal [Ref 19, pg. 594].
D. ISLAMIC MOVEMNT
Disillusionment of Bourguiba's short lived reforms in
providing social and economic prosperity offered fertile
ground for the nurturing of a revived Islam as the solution to
societies various ills. Bourguiba quickly came to realize
that the force which allowed him to harness the support of the
population at the time of independence could also cause the
demise of his regime. Accordingly, rather than dealing with
the economic, social and political ills, Bourguiba elected to
try and contain the forces of Islam in an effort to protect
his regime, the ruling party and the secular society he tried
to create.
As in most countries of the Middle East, the rise of an
Islamic movement in Tunisia was not associated with the ulama
and a discredited religious establishment [Ref 23, pg. 6081.
In Tunisia it began with widespread support for the labor
union, Union Generale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (UGTT), who
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questioned the economic and political policies of the regime.
The labor union:
... opposed the continued foreign influence in the
economy and society, decried the reliance on tourism -
the country's major earner of foreign exchange - and
objected to the secularization policies associated
with Bourguiba since his early battles with Ben
Youssef. [Ref 18, pg. 2451
In a first attempt to head-off major Islamic sentiment
during the 1970's, Bourguiba published editorials and special
articles on Islamic topics and the Koran in an effort to
reaffirm the governments commitment toward Islam. These
attempts however failed. [Ref 19, pg. 601]
By the end of the 1970's Tunisia had several Islamic
organizations; the Islamic Shura Party, the Islamic
Progressive Tendency, the Islamic Vanguard, the Islamic
Liberation Party and the Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI).
[Ref 19, pg. 6081. Membership in the MTI reflects individuals
of whom 48 percent came from families where the parents were
illiterate and 46 percent had parents who were either laborers
in the agriculture sector or the industrial sector [Ref 26].
The MTI, headed by Rashid Ghannouchi, was the only Islamic
organization with a political content. Again concerned with
the power of Islamic mobility, Bourguiba agreed with his Prime
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Minister, Muhammad Mzali, to enact political democratization
(Ref 18, pg. 2461. As a result, in 1981 the MTI declared
itself a political party whose objectives were:
(1) the renewal of the Tunisian Islamic
personality, (2) the revival of Islamic thought and
principles in order to conduct the battle against
centuries of societal decadence; (3) the
reorganisation of economic life along humanitarian
guidelines; (4) the return of legitimate rights and
freedoms to the masses, and (5) the revival of Islam's
political identity at local, North African and global
levels. (Ref 19, pg 6041
But Bourguiba saw the MTI as a threat to his regime fueled by
an article in the Le Monde newspaper that "the integristes'
were taking over the organisation and using it as a tool
against the PSD" [Ret 19, pg. 6021. Lisa Anderson suggests
that Bourguiba's compromise with the MTI allowed his
government to weaken its opposition by "removing one of the
major political grievances against the regime" and thereby
allowing the regime, before the elections, to take action
against its major opponent the MTI (Ref 18, pg. 247]. The
end result however was governmental crackdown on the Islamic
fundamentalists and the MTI was banned from association. [Ref
19, pg. 6021
By cutting off an avenue of opposition toward the regime
through the banning of association of the MTI, Bourguiba
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doubled his problems by creating a political vacuum for




A. FROM BOURGUIBA TO BEN ALl
The transition from Bourguiba to Ben Ali occurred on
November 7, 1987 when then Prime Minister Ben Ali assembled a
group of doctors who proclaimed that Bourguiba's mental and
physical health had deteriorated to the point that he could no
longer meet the obligations of the office of presidency. Ben
Ali subsequently invoked Article 57 of the Tunisian
Constitution which provided that in the event of the
incapacity of the head of state to fulfill his duties, the
prime minister would be immediately invested with the
functions of presidency for the remainder of the term of the
national legislature.
The accession of Ben Ali was based largely on two factors:
1) Bourguiba's deteriorating physical and mental health lead
to frequent reversals of administrative appointments and
accusations of those around him of lying and trickery. 2)
Bourguiba's handling of the trial of the Islamic
fundamentalists, banned members of the Movement of the Islamic
Way (MTI) who were viewed as challengers to his legitimacy,
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coupled by the uncovering of an MTI plot to assassinate top
political figures including Ben Ali, only undermined the
extent of his instability. Bourguiba's fate was brought to a
head with the condemnation to death in absentia of accused
Islamists, demands for retrials of other fundamentalists who
received sentences less than death and the imprisonment
without trial of seventy-three members of the attempted
assassination plot for two years. (Ref 27, pg. 131
Additionally, the economic unrest associated with the lack
of jobs remained a constant source of pressure on the
Bourguiba government. Economic conditions had festered since
the 1970's:
... agriculture was neglected; the decline of
European affluence made the Tunisian tourist market
unreliable; the Tunisian petroleum industry was
depressed as oil prices slid precipitously in the wake
of the global market glut of the early 1980's; and the
minimum agricultural and industrial wage was not
permitted to rise commensurate with the level of
inflation. In addition, the population was growing at
a rate whereby currently 60 percent of Tunisia's 7.5
million inhabitants are less than 30 years of age
and.. .more than 25 percent of them are unemployed.
Moveover, Bourguiba's heavy emphasis on public
education raised the socioeconomic aspirations of the
nation's youth, which the country was unable to
satisfy. [Ref 28, pg. 5891
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B. BEN ALI
In comparison to Bourguiba, Ben Ali has been described as
opposite in character. Ben Ali is described as:
... an unassuming not a galvanizing speaker; a
listener, not an autocrat; a bureaucrat from mii±tary
intelligence, not a founding father of a party; and a
man with a sense of the separation of state and party
and of civil liberties for citizens. [Ref 27, pg. 13]
Born on 3 September 1936 in the small town of Hammam-
Sousse on the Mediterranean coast, Ben Ali began an
association with the Neo-Destour party at an early age.
During his secondary education he was expelled from all
schools in Tunisia due to his activism against French colonial
rule where he acted as the liaison between the regional
structure of the Neo-Destour and the armed resistance forces.
As a result, he was sent to France by the Destourian party
where he was among the first who formed the nucleus of the
future national security army. He subsequently completed
training at the Inter-Arms School of Saint-Cyr, the Artillery
School at Chalons-Sur-Marne France, the Senior Intelligence
School at Fort Holabird Maryland and the School For Field and
Anti-Aircraft Artillery at Fort Bliss Texas. [Ref 29]
In 1974 he was appointed Defense, Military, Naval and Air
Attache in Morocco and Spain, and in 1977, he was appointed
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Director-General of National Security where he coordinated the
police and military response during the UGTT labor crisis of
1978. In 1980 he was appointed Ambassador to Poland but was
recalled to Tunisia in the aftermath of the infamous bread
riots and promoted to the rank of brigadier general. In
January of 1984 he was appointed Head of National Security.
Ten months later, out of fear that strong measures might be
required to counter disaffection of bad harvests, creeping
inflation and growing unemployment, he was appointed Secretary
of State for National Security and Defense and then in October
1985 he was appointed Minister of the Interior. [Ref 28, pp.
593-594) In October 1987 he was named Prime Minister while
retaining the responsibilities of Ministry of the Interior
[Ref 291.
Ben Ali attributes his American experience with helping
shape his sense of democracy:
I listen, I think, I act but I don't like to talk.
I learned that in the United States.. .You learn about
analysis, and how to use analysis in political
situations. [Ref 30]
C. NATIONAL PACT
The National Pact of 1988, which was reportedly widely
applauded by both Tunisians and foreign observers allowed Ben
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Ali, as Bourguiba in his early years, enormous popularity from
all of the Tunisian populace including the Tunisian
intelligentsia. The National Pact was seen by many as a
democratic opening but realistically it only provided limited
guidance for political actions. The National Pact was
intended to establish the guiding principles for a new, more
democratic political regime addressing the four general areas
of national identity, political life, economic development and
foreign relations. The National Pact basically proclaimed
Tunisia's commitment to democracy and human rights; emphasized
the importance of women's rights and equality; reaffirmed the
country's Islamic identity; and guaranteed certain basic
political freedoms. (Ref 31, pg. 88]
As the Personal Code under Bourguiba was to promote
secular modernization by targeting the Islamists, the National
Pact of Ben Ali targeted the Islamists too and provided a
device to promote his vision of society and politics by
allowing selected opposition toward his policies to articulate
a common vision and to pledge their allegiance to the country.
[Ref 16, pg. 252] In essence, the National Pact is a
symbolic gesture which allowed Ben Ali to bring his selected
opposition into his political fold and thereby be under his
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control. The Pact moved up the parliamentary elections
scheduled for 1991 to April 1989 and by doing so did not allow
political participation by organizations that had not yet
received legal recognition such as the Al-Nahda and prevented
a number of prominent opposition figures from engaging in
political activity as they had not yet regained their
political rights. [Ref 31, pg. 89]
If it had been an interest of Ben Ali to extend civil and
political liberties to foster legitimacy, the National Pact
was also an astute political strategy to make allies of his
new governments critics - specifically the Islamists and human
rights activists. As the Minister of Interior and person
administratively responsible for the security forces
engagement in torture and ill-treatment under Bourguiba, Ben
Ali had frequently been the target of criticism. [Ref 32, pg.
37] The text of the National Pact reflects a proclamation
that:
Human rights imply safeguarding the security of
the individual and guaranteeing his freedom and
dignity. This means banning torture and physical
punishment, prohibiting all forms of arbitrary
behaviour to be practised neither by the state nor by
organizations or individuals. They also imply
guaranteeing the freedom of thought and expression,
the freedom of the press and printing and the freedom
of worship. [Ref 33, pg. 14]
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D. BIN ALI'S DUKOCR.CY
As delineated in the National Pact, democracy is described
on the basis of:
... a multiplicity of thought and organization. It
caters for the needs of competition for power and
implies a care for the people's will, expressed in
periodic elections, free and correctly held, where the
majority draws its legitimacy in exercising power, and
must respect alternative opinions and the rights of
minorities. (Ref 33, pg. 14]
From this description of democracy it is apparent that the
basis of the electoral law is the majority system rather than
proportional representation which in essence allows the
government's party to retain effective control over the so
called democratic opening of Tunisia. When asked whether or
not the one party domination of the Tunisian parliament casts
a shadow over the processes of democracy in Tunisia, Ben Ali
responded:
It is not our fault that the Chamber of Deputi s
contains only one party. We have made great efforts
to ensure that this is not the case, because we are
convinced that the presence of a political party in
that chamber is essential for democracy. [Ref 34]
Clearly the transition from a single-party to a multi-
party regime requires a clear-cut distinction between the
nation state and the ruling party. As Lisa Anderson suggests,
perhaps Ben Ali's strategy is to maintain close ties to the
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country's security apparatus, the Interior Ministry
administration and the ruling party until the foundations of
his new era have been well laid. The National Pact therefore
serves as a symbolic representation of the nation state and a
broader perspective than the ruling party and at the same time
introduces the legitimate right to differ while maintaining
the old regime for stabilization. (Ref 16, pp. 258-2591
E. ISLAMIC MOVEMENT
The al-Nahda Islamic movement, originally called the
Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique (MTI), is claimed by the
government to be an extremist group that is willing to use
violence to install a repressive theocracy. The al-Nahda in
contrast claims that it is committed to using only democratic,
nonviolent means to achieve a tolerant Islamic state. [Ref
35, pg. 3441 Ghannouchi stated:
The al-Nahda movement is an Islamic politico-
ideological movement that calls on the people to
return to Islam, the true identity of the Tunisian
people, and also to adopt Arabic as the official
language for administrative and educational purposes.
We consider democracy and political means a solution
for resolving politico-ideological differences in
social life. We strive for cooperation and unity
among all the oppressed nations and the Islamic ummah.
[Ref 36]
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Legislation passed by the parliament in April 1988 and
reemphasized in the National Pact of November 1988 established
criteria and guidelines for the recognition and conduct of
political parties. In order to be legally recognized as a
political party, parties are required to uphold the
Constitution which includes the provisions against violence,
discrimination and fanaticism; parties are forbidden to
receive support from abroad; forbidden to pursue religious,
racial, linguistic or regional objectives; and cannot be
headed by individuals who have been convicted of certain
political offenses. Political parties once recognized also
require permission of the government prior to holding any
large public gathering. [Ref 31, pp. 87-88] Additional
criteria expressed verbally by Ben Ali specifically for
opposition parties includes:
-All parties should respect the laws of democracy
and its requirements, and accept the results of honest
competition, because this constitutes respect for the
people's will.
-The opposition must not attack the electoral law or
use it as a pretext to justify their failure,
especially since there are no legal justifications,
which usually appear in the form of violations before
or after the elections.
-The opposition parties should acquire long experience
in political action that would guarantee their
presence in the national arena and that would enable
them to enrich our political system. [Ref 371
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The seven recognized political parties are as listed in
Appendix A. Middle East Watch views the criteria and conduct
established for political parties as a violation of the right
of free association. The rights of free association which
were promulgated in 1992 prohibits an individual from holding
a leadership position in a political party and an association
simultaneously and prohibits organizations from refusing
membership to any person who claims to accept its principles.
Because of this criteria the Tunisian League for Human Rights
was dissolved. [Ref 35, pg. 345]
When Ben Ali assumed the presidency in 1987 he:
... promised that the political freedoms he was
enacting would be extended to the MTI as soon as it
met the official criteria for recognition as a
political party. The MTI responded by calling Ben
Ali's accession to power a divine act meant to save
the country from civil war. Its leaders lavishly
praised Ben Ali's reforms, declared that they would
uphold the Constitution and accept the other criteria
for recognition, and renamed the MTI the Hezb al-Nahda
in order to deemphasize its Islamist orientation.
[Ref 31, pg. 91]
In many respects Ben Ali's promises raised false hopes
that the al-Nahda would be recognized as a political party.
Ben Ali may have hoped that the prospects of recognition would
foster moderate views and opinions within the al-Nahda or he
may have feared that official recognition would threaten his
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reforms for democracy. Whatever his motivation, the al-Nahda
has not been recognized as a political party. Most recently
Ben Ali reasons that:
Their intention was clear, it has always been to
create an Islamic state. These men are intolerant and
undemocratic. I broke off dialogue with them when I
became aware of their double-talk.... [Ref 34]
F. DEMOCRATIC REFORMS IN PRACTICE
Although the National Pact decreed the freedom of thought
and expression, the freedom of the press and printing, the
freedom of religion and the recognition of human rights, in
practice the freedoms are not so easily recognized. The
government reportedly controls the radio and television media
and closely monitors the press which forces journalists to
practice self-censorship. In one instance the weekly
newspaper of the Communist Workers' Party was reportedly
seized due to articles that were deemed by the government to
harm relations between Tunisia and friendly countries. [Ref
38] In another instance when the contents of an article
published in the official newspaper of the Social-Democrat
Movement criticized the pace of democratic reform in Tunisia
and the ruling party for refusing to relinquish or share
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power, the secret police were dispatched to buy all the issues
of the newspaper from the stands. [Ref 39, pg. 2)
When al-Nahda was directed by the Prime Minister in 1989
to submit two applications; one for a political party and one
for a newspaper, the newspaper application was accepted
provided there was a three week waiting period. During that
time reportedly the Minister of Interior contacted and
directed all the publishing houses not to print the newspaper
while at the same time threatened to revoke the licenses of
any distributor who distributed the newspaper. [Ref 39, pg.
2]
With reference to free elections, reportedly the
government instituted measures of reprisal and punishment to
anyone who voted for or participated in the campaigns of the
independent candidates. The resulting actions were that:
Privately owned businesses such as bookstores,
milk shops and taxi drivers had their licenses revoked
and public and private sector workers, university
professors and ten imams were fired from their jobs.
[Ref 39, pg. 2]
While the UGTT was the focal point of the Islamic movement
under Bourguiba, labor union activity under Ben Ali reportedly
remains restricted as meetings at the place of work are
outlawed and the right to strike is limited. The state also
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reportedly exercises control over the country's mosques by
appointing and paying all prayer leaders. [Ref 31, pg. 891
Violations of human rights has been as issue dominated by
the governments crackdown on the al-Nahda, its main opposition
and whose trial is reminiscent of the mass trials of the
Islamists that took place under Bourguiba. Numerous cases of
death by torture and widespread incidence of rape inflicted on
the wives of arrested Islamic party militants reportedly never
reached official publications because the official body
assigned to investigate the allegations was composed of
individuals appointed directly by Ben Ali [Ref 40].
Ghannouchi accused the government of exploiting the Gulf
War to liquidate the Islamic movement in Tunisia.
Specifically he stated that the Gulf War allowed Ben Ali:
to proceed with his security measures to liquidate
the movement, and finish the process that former
President Bourguiba began but was unable to finish.
Seven young members of the Movement had been killed,
and 1200 people detained - among whom were the leaders
of the Movement - while the world was still occupied
by the Gulf War, the biggest news at that time. Once
the Gulf war ended, pain and suffering returned to the
people of Tunisia; freedoms were tightened; and the
country's real problems returned to the fore. [Ref
41]
During 1992, 279 suspected al-Nahda members who were
arrested in 1990 and 1991 were tried by two military courts
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accused of plotting to overthrow the government and
assassinate the president in order to establish an Islamic
Republic (Ref 35, pg. 3441. Amnesty International claims
that between 1990 and 1992 more that 9,000 Islamists had been
detained. Torture was described as:
... systematic abuses in police and National Guard
stations and in the Ministry of Interior headquarters
in Tunis. Amnesty documented several deaths in
detention in 1991 that were apparently due to torture
and found that the evidence that violations are
condoned at the highest level is compelling. [Ref 35,
pg. 344]
During an interview regarding the abuses within Tunisia
and the objectives of the Islamic movement Ghannouchi stated:
The movement's greatest demand in the face of the
ruling regime's violence and brutality is for freedom
of political activity for political parties. To
achieve this objective we entered the arena by
mobilizing the nation's offspring to participate in
marches so that we could make the government realize
that we demand our lawful rights. One of the
distinctive and obvious traits of political life in
Tunis has been the great difference between the word
and deed of its ruling parties. While the regime
proclaims itself the supporter of human rights and
adherent of freedom and democracy, facts and figures
prove the situation to be otherwise. [Ref 36]
In defense, Ben Ali has stated:
Tunisia has every right to be proud of its human
rights record. We unreservedly subscribed to the
international convention against torture and inhuman
and degrading treatment. I am personally working to
ensure respect for the provisions of that convention.
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But, in this sphere, it is impossible to be vigilant
enough. [Ref 34]
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V. TUNISIAN ECONOMY AND FOREIGN RELATIONS
A. ECONOMIC PLANS
The proclamation of democracy by the Western-trained
President Ben Ali is indicative of Tunisia's need for interna-
tional acceptance, confidence and recognition as a friendly
and politically stable country worthy of the benefits of
international investment. Two economic plans have been
instituted under President Ben Ali and although both have been
hopeful, neither has allowed Tunisia co develop an
infrastructure capable of sustaining self-sufficiency. The
seventh five year economic plan (1987-1991) in fact inspired
hope that Tunisia may "replace Lebanon as a key financial link
between the Arab World and Europe." [Ref 42]
Although Tunisia has moved away from state socialism
toward an open economy by taking measures to ease restrictions
on foreign investments and by becoming a contracting member of
GATT in 1990 as a means to join the world economy, Tunisia's
major barriers to economic growth appear to be unemployment,
lack of education and although not a direct factor, a high
level of imports which has discouraged production from within.
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In 1990, 300,000 persons or 13 percent of Tunisia's
workforce were reportedly unemployed [Ref 43]. In 1993,
unemployment was reportedly 15 percent [Ref 44, pg. 15].
Adding to this already high level was concern that in 1990
nearly 60 percent of Tunisia's estimated eight million
citizens were under the age of 24 which meant that within the
next decade more than two million additional persons would
enter the local job market [Ref 45].
The objectives of the 1987-1991 plan which included the
devaluation of the dinar to stimulate exports and help
tourism, envisioned an annual gross domestic product (GDP)
growth rate of 4 percent compared to a 6 percent estimated
figure for the period 1982-1986 which was actually 3 percent.
The 1987-1991 plan targeted job creation for 240,000 persons,
30,000 less than the targeted 1982-1986 plan, and actually
only totalled 200,000. [Ref 46, pg. 901] Accordingly,
unemployment can be considered a serious threat to Tunisia's
economic growth as either economic stagnation or slow
development and growth can cause social unrest and economic
and political instability.
The eighth five year economic plan (1992-1996) with a
target to reduce the budget deficit to 1.2 percent of GDP,
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appears to focus more on broad policy objectives such as the
creation of jobs and decentralization than the 1987-1991 plan.
The plan also includes goals to increase direct investments
and to make the Tunisian economy more market oriented [Ref
47]. Specifically the plan envisions:
... the creation of 320,000 new jobs. Public
expenditure will be focused on health, education,
housing and services, with priority for investment in
transport and communications, and emphasis will also
be placed on regional development, particularly in
western Tunisia. Also planned are further reduction
in subsidies on consumer and other products...; the
disposal of all state assets except in strategic
sectors such as electricity generation; the elimina-
tion of price controls on manufactured goods; and the
introduction for the first time, of selective charges
for health, education and other services. [Ref 48,
pg. 842]
Privatization as a goal however worthy creates
complications also. As pointed out by Moffett, privatization
will also mean that Tunisian companies will have to release
some employees in order to compete in the private sector which
means that more people will then be unemployed [Ref 42].
Privatization then will also create higher social costs to the
government and probable unrest due to the planned cuts in
subsidies.
When representatives from Tunisia met with officials of
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank in May
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1993 to discuss Tunisia's financial requirements for
implementation of the eighth five year program, the IMF and
World Bank called for investment of approximately 14 percent
of total GDP to be provided by the private sector. Tunisian
officials response was that the private sector "could not
generate all of this investment" and Tunisian therefore would
need "foreign loans on preferential terms." [Ref 46, pg. 201
Attempts by the government to allow some privatization in 1991
were not successful as reportedly "the private sector's
appetite for buying state assets was poor" (Ref 43, pg. 1351.
It is clear that if Tunisia's attempts for privatization
are to be successful, Tunisia must simultaneously and
aggressively pursue this plans emphasis for education,
eliminating the illiteracy rates of 19 percent for males aged
15-29 and 30 percent for women of the same age group, in order
to motivate, develop and enable the population to realize
their full potential in economic management and develop an
infrastructure capable of self-sufficiency. [Ref 49, pg. 91
One hinderance to this tasking may be the ideals of Islamic
thought where the concepts of individual and state capitalism
are rejected [Ref 50, pp. 271-272].
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B. BILATERAL INVESTMKNT TREATY
With a major focus on external support and indicative of
Tunisia's proclamations of democracy, Tunisia and the U.S.
signed a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) in January 1993
which solidified Tunisia's commitment to the promotion of
economic growth and development through foreign investment as
a means to attract capital, new technology and marketing
expertise. Corey Wright of the Office of the Near East, U.S.
Department of Commerce states that the U.S. in 1992 was the
fourth largest supplier to the Tunisian market [Ref 51, pg.
401.
The Bilateral Investment Treaty guarantees American
investors:
- The right to establish investments on a basis no
less favorable than that accorded to investors of
third countries, and subject to existing laws, on a
basis no less favorable than that accorded to domestic
investors;
- Treatment of investment that is no less favorable
than that accorded to domestic investments or to
investors of nationals of any third country, which
ever is more favorable;
- International Law Standards for expropriation and
compensation;
- Free transfers of capital.. .and
- The right to submit disputes to international
arbitration through the World Bank's International
Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes. [Ref
48, pg 241
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Reciprocal in nature, this bilateral treaty is one of a
two track economic and foreign investment strategy. The
intent of this treaty is to promote the idea of Tunisia as a
platform from which non-European Community countries can enter
the European Community through Tunisia's associative status
and benefits. In essence, U.S. investors would bring capital
and technology into Tunisia which would generate manufactured
goods that would enter the European Community as Tunisian
products. [Ref 52, pg. 237]
On the other hand, this strategy is intended to encourage
other partnerships through treaties where Tunisian enterprises
would benefit from outside investment and technology for the
joint production of goods to be sold in the European Community
and elsewhere. [Ref 52, pg. 2381
C. EUROPEAN CO)MUNITY
Tunisia's relationship with the European Community stems
from Tunisia's economic dependence on trade relationships. As
a resource poor country, Tunisia is dependent for both raw
materials and products. Due to its close proximity to the
European market, Tunisia was able early on to benefit from
tourism, labeled the single largest source of income in 1990,
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where in 1993, British tourists rose by 21 percent and French
tourists rose by 24 percent compared to overall tourism in
1992 [Ref 49, pg. 181.
In 1976 Tunisia entered into agreement with the European
Community where Tunisian industrial exports could enter the
European Community provided they were manufactured in Tunisia.
Voluntary restraining agreements were accepted by Tunisia with
regard to the textile sector which limited cotton fabrics in
certain European markets while agriculture products were
subject to restrictions. [Ref 52, pg. 232-233)
Today, Tunisia's export and trade practices are heavily
oriented toward the European Community with France, Italy and
Germany respectively as the leading trading partners. Figures
for 1993 reflect that 80 percent of Tunisian exports were to
Europe and that Europe provided 71 percent of Tunisia's
imports. Conversely, Tunisia's trade deficit has continued to
widen where in 1992 Tunisia's trade deficit with France rose
26 percent, 163 percent with Italy and 55 percent with
Germany. [Ref 49, pp. 19-20] Tunisia is as commercially
dependent on Europe as Mexico is on the U.S. [Ref 53]. To
this end, President Ben Ali has been seeking a partnership
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agreement with the European Community. His hopes for this
agreement include:
-increased quotas for agricultural exports to the
EC...,new products added to the list, and an EC credit
line to encourage European investment in Tunisian
agriculture;
-a free-trade zone with the EC. Tunisia proposed the
rapid dismantling of EC barriers to Tunisian exports,
especially textiles and food; in return Tunisia would
gradually dismantle its own tariffs on imports of
European agricultural and industrial products,
covering 35% of imports within six years and 100% in
12 years;
-closer cooperation in industrial development, and a
special line of credit to encourage European invest-
ment in Tunisian industry;
-financial cooperation to recycle Tunisia's debt
repayments, support for the structural adjustment
programme, including access to the European Develop-
ment Bank, and the creation of a Europe-Maghreb Bank;
and
-cooperation in technical training, and in science and
technology. [Ref 46, pp. 20-211
Continued trade dependence between Tunisia and Europe
however comes under question with the changing economic trade
zones on a global level. Other regions in the world are close
to Europe too and this lends possibility to the fact that
competition for Tunisian trade, particularly in the area of
high-tech electronic component assembly, could exist with
Southeast Asia.
To this end, President Ben Ali continues to strive to
present Tunisia as a stable environment worthy of European and
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Western investment - a condition which was upset by Tunisia's
sympathetic support for Iraq during the Gulf War.
D. IF AND THE WORLD BANK
The IMF and the World Bank have operated under what
Callaghy refers to as an "unwritten contract" where third
world countries enter into agreement that if they successfully
reform their economies in a neoclassical manner, modified now
as the new neoclassical model which stresses education and
human capital formation, with the direction of the IMF and the
World Bank, then new voluntary international loans and foreign
investment will be available to sustain their economic reforms
[Ref 54, pp. 173-1741. Supposedly the loans or aid from the
IMF and the World Bank are not linked to political reforms
however other sources of credit seem to be influenced
politically by the interests of the developed capitalist
countries.
Tunisia entered the IMF program in 1986 under President
Bourguiba when the Tunisian economy was near collapse. A loan
for $259 million was entered into as a means to reduce
Tunisia's deficits and public spending [Ref 42]. In 1988,
one year after the Western oriented President Ben Ali took
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over, the IMF approved a three year :xtended fund of $270.6
million and the World Bank committed to providing $1.5 billion
for the period 1987-1991. At the same time reportedly an
African Development Bank offered a $79 million credit line to
finance tourism and industrial projects, England's Midland
Bank financed $27 million and the Italian government provided
$500 million in loans and grants for a five year period. (Ref
55, pg. 17]
The IMF sponsored economic reform program of 1988 attempt-
ed to reduce the deficit through measures which liberalized
external trade, promoted privatization of state enterprises
and implemented various tax reforms. These measures proved
somewhat successful as Tunisia requested a reduction in credit
available in the three year extended fund facility although
this request was subsequently withdrawn at the end of the Gulf
War. (Ref 47, pg. 841]
Prior to the Gulf War Tunisia's deficit in 1990 was
estimated to be $549 million principally as a result of
ecological factors such as drought and floods. The impact of
the Gulf War greatly effected Tunisia's tourism and export
sectors, particularly with the loss of Iraqi trade, and the
revised deficit was estimated at $800 million. [Ref 43, pg.
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134] As a result, the government attempted to reduce the
deficit by:
... imposing a freeze on capital spending, rises in
taxes on cigarettes, alcohol and petrol and a 5
percent exceptional import duty. Five days' pay was
also docked from all employees in the formal sector
and the government announced another blitz on
subsidies the bill for which had been growing at
nearly 25 percent a year. [Ref 43, pg. 134]
Indicative of Tunisia's dependence on foreign trade which
had fallen overall by 30 percent as a result of the Gulf War,
Tunisia requested restoration of full IMF credit. The World
Bank was also reportedly considering a $150 million loan for
rural planning and development at the time. [Ref 471
The unified investment code, which was introduced in
December 1993, was one stipulation placed upon Tunisia for
loans from the IMF and World Bank. The intent of the code is
to offer tax incentives to investments which would create
jobs, boost exports, involve the transfer of technology and
assist in environmental protection and regional development.
[Ref 56, pg. 4] There has been opposition to the code however
by local businessmen who fear that the code would eliminate
tax breaks to which they were already entitled and that the
code would favor foreign and export companies over local
entrepreneurs [Ref 46, pg. 19].
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The World Bank also agreed to provide $120 million to
Tunisian banks in support of banking system reforms which are
intended to foster more efficient management practices and to
increase competition between Tunisian banks [Ref 46, pg. 29].
E. MAGPBB
In keeping with the economic strategy of Tunisia as
previously addressed, President Ben Ali's attempts to expand
and diversify Tunisia's economic relations includes the Arab
Maghreb Union (AMU), established in 1989, comprising the five
nations of Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, Mauritania and Morocco.
Since its establishment Tunisian imports from the member
countries has risen by 2 percent and Tunisian exports to the
member countries has risen by 2.7 percent for a total of 7.9
percent in 1992. [Ref 46, pg. 28]
Holding the position of rotating presidency of the Union
during 1993, President Ben Ali attempted to build a relation-
ship between the AMU and the European Community. Tunisian
Prime Minister Hamed Karoui identified the importance of the
AMU during an interview stating that the AMU is:
... a vital and historic necessity in view of the
developments and changes the world is experiencing and
the emergence of groupings and blocs. [Ref 57]
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President Ben Ali, stressing the need for the protection
of the rights of the AMU countries in Europe, has reportedly
stated that:
By complementing each others' initiatives, we can
eradicate the causes of extremism, fanaticism and
racism on both sides [of the Mediterranean] and build
strong relations based upon cooperation and under-
standing. [Ref 46, pg. 10]
Unfortunately however not only has the membership within
the AMU lost its appeal as evidenced by the lack of attendance
at the AMU summit in 1992 where only three of the five heads
of state attended but the dialogue between the AMU and the
European Community experienced similar difficulties (Ref 58,
pg. 131. Political turmoil in Algeria over the Islamic Front
and the UN imposed sanctions against Libya over the Lockerbie
affair have distanced any progress toward economic union and
in fact blocked the 1993 so-called 5+5 dialogue between the
European countries of Spain, Portugal, Italy, France and Malta
and the AMU [Ref 59, pg. 5]. President Ben Ali, determined
to establish a relationship between the AMU and the European
Community has reportedly stated that:
... the EC had offered Eastern Europe money,
possibilities and partnership in order to prepare it
for a market economy and for democracy. Similar
offers to the countries of the Maghreb... could help
further those same goals there. [Ref 46, pg. 10-11]
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Although President Ben Ali has been trying to act as the
negotiator between the Western states and Libya to resolve the
Lockerbie affair, a meeting of the AMU foreign ministers in
early 1993 ended in agreement by those who attended to
temporarily cease attempts to build an economic union.
Morocco's foreign minister reportedly stated that nona of the
accords originally signed at the establishment of the AMU had
been implemented nor would they be as each member country had
"a different economic orientation." [Ref 59, pgo 13]
In keeping with the intent of the established economic
strategy of Tunisia, it can be assumed that a prosperous
dialogue between the AMU and European community would reduce
tensions and promote a more favorable economic environment
through the redirection of resources which promote economic
development and the exchange of technologies. Tunisia,
seemingly the most active member of the Union, could provide
the needed interface and balance between the two communities.
But Ben Ali's attempts to increase cooperation among the
Maghreb states can also be reflective of a growing and common
concern of an economic threat from the West and the challenge
of the unification of Europe's market. [Ref 52, pg. 2221
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In a world where regional trading blocks are developing
however, the AMU is an example of how the poorer countries
will have a mire difficult task of integration and shared
economic growth as regional neighbors because their previous
economic prosperity has been linked to either the West or
Europe [Ref 601.
F. FOREIGN AID
As dependent as Tunisia is on European trade so to is
Tunisia dependent on foreign economic and military aid. For
1991 Tunisia's foreign debt was reportedly $8,296 million, an
increase of $4,770 million from 1980, and an external debt of
66.2 percent of the gross national product (GNP) which is a
7.7 percent decrease from 1987 [Ref 47, pp. 843-8441. A
summarized total of U.S. aid to Tunisia, inclusive of military
supplies and services and credits extended to private
entities, is a listed in Appendix B. These totals reflect
extensive military aid to Tunisia during the Libyan
adventurism in the 1980's and a large increase in 1989
presumable as a result of the constitutional coup and Ben
Ali's declarations of democracy.
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Overall, foreign aid has allowed Tunisia the capability of
stimulating economic development and growth as well as
modernizing their armed forces.
1. Economic Aid
The major sources of economic aid to Tunisia have been
the Western countries. France has been Tunisia's largest
bilateral donor providing annual credits followed by the U.S.
and the Gulf Arab states. The major multilateral donors of
economic aid have been the World Bank Group. [Ref 47, pg.
8431 Indicative of Tunisia's reliance on foreign aid is the
quickness with which Tunisia's new foreign minister Habib Ben
Yahia gave reassurance to the U.S. of its position which being
questionable, resulted in the reduction of Tunisia's aid
during the Gulf War [Ref 43, pg. 134].
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
provided a total contribution of $100 million to help fund
projects which were initiated from 1983 including programs to
improve Tunisian housing and to advance agriculture
development [Ref 46, pg. 291. USAID also agreed to provide
an additional $50 million in 1993 for projects to improve
Tunisian infrastructures such as road construction, drainage
and even drinking water oupplies [Ref 49, pg. 21].
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One of the major concerns with regard to foreign aid
is whether or not the aid is used for the project specified or
rather as a means to maintain the status quo. Tunisia
received U.S. food aid in the amount $107 million in 1987 and
this amount increased to $135 million during 1990 [Ref 61,
pg. 9691. As the majority of aid through principal can be
directed somewhat through the IMF and World Bank, it appears
that Tunisia may not be an exception to the misuse of aid. As
a result of the heavy rains and floods which devastated
Tunisia in 1990, much of the relief aid is said to have been
"distributed by the ruling party in an attempt to buy the
votes of the recipients" rather than provide relief to the
victims [Ref 39, pg. 81.
2. Military Aid
Tunisia's geographical location can be considered of
strategic importance in the Mediterranean. Additionally,
Tunisia is surrounded by, in comparison, the more powerful
countries of Algeria and Libya. As demonstrated during the
19801s, Tunisia has been vulnerable to the adventurism of
Libya as well as attacks to the Palestinian Liberation
Organization (PLO) headquartered in Tunis. These actions have
in turn threatened regional stability and in essence U.S.
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interests. As a result, the U.S. has provided foreign
military financing/sales (FMF/FMS), international military
education and training (IMET) and military assistance to
Tunisia of approximately $1 billion. In 1985 alone it is
estimated that the U.S provided $36 million in military
assistance, negotiated $22.5 million in arms agreements with
Tunisia and Tunisia received loans directly from the U.S. in
the amount of $50 million. (Ref 62, pp. 306-3071
The FMF/FMS programs have allowed Tunisia to modernize
their armed forces through the procurement and maintenance of
numerous tanks, aircraft and artillery without having to
divert resources from their economic development while the
IMET and military assistance programs have provided flight and
technical training. The most current information for
Tunisia's defense expenditures, 1987, reflects $289 million or
9 percent of GNP [Ref 61, pg. 970].
In the post Cold War environment the need for
continued U.S. military support to Tunisia remains because of
the continued possibility of Libyan adventurism and the
revival of Islamic movements which may threaten the stability
of the region. In that Tunisia's military weaknesses have
been identified in the areas of long-range radar detection
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capabilities and air defenses, Tunisia has continued to look
to the U.S. for support in the modernization of its defense
program [Ref 61, pg. 9691. Relying not only on the U.S. for
support, reportedly in 1990 Tunisia signed a joint cooperation
agreement with Turkey and entered into discussions with ship
builders in Great Britain for the procurement of ships and
France for the acquisition of jet aircraft [Ref 61, pg. 969].
As a means to foster good relations and support, Tunisia has
taken part in a number of peace-keeping operations including
Somalia, Cambodia and Yugoslavia [Ref 63, pg. 31.
Without U.S. and European military aid, it seems
apparent that Tunisia could not maintain its present armed
forces readiness in both personnel and equipment nor could
Tunisia continue its defense modernization program.
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VI. U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
A. U.S. INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
U.S. vital and major interests in the Middle East and
North Africa include oil access, security of Israel and the
promotion of democracy and free markets to enhance political
stability.
1. Oil Access
The vital interest and heart of strategic interest of
the U.S. in the Middle East is access to oil. The U.S. is one
of the largest consumers of oil importing half of its oil
supply [Ref 64, pg. 24].
Gulf oil originally became linked to U.S. military
security by former President Eisenhower in 1957 but was
declared "vital" to U.S. interests by former President Carter
in the wake of the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan [Ref 65, pg. 2]. Throughout the Cold War, the
ultimate concern of the U.S. and gulf oil was the threat of
Soviet control over that oil which could critically alter the
strategic balance. This interest also increased the strategic
importance of the North African region as the Maghreb not only
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flanked the access route in the Mediterranean to the Middle
East but was also the southern flank of NATO.
Due to the large dependency on Gulf oil, particularly
from Saudi Arabia, the demise of the Soviet Union has not
decreased U.S. interests. Accordingly, any challenge to Gulf
oil access would be quickly met as is evidenced by Saddam
Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. With the end of the Cold War
where surely economic competition, ethnic rivalries and
regional conflicts will mount, until an alternate energy
source is found, oil will remain the strategic commodity that
is critical to international politics and national strategies
[Ref 64, pg 251.
2. Security Of Israel
American thinking prior to the Johnson administration
tended to see Israel as:
... a diplomatic liability, frustrating American
efforts to organize the Arab world in The Cold War
alliance arrangements. [Ref 66, pg 271
The June 1967 War, along with the ethnic favoritism of
former President Johnson for the Jewish community over the
Arab community, resulted in a shift in American thinking where
Israel was labeled as a strategic asset and considered to be
an ally of the U.S. against the forme iet Union. [Ref 66,
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pg. 27] Since the end cf the Cold War, Israel has remained a
U.S. interest as a result of a strong pro-Israeli lobby in the
U.S. Israel is also seen as a "stable friend" of the U.S.
providing forward bases, intelligence and military cooperation
against any regional threats to U.S. interests.
3. Democracy And Free Markets
a. Promotion Of Democracy
The promotion of democracy has been considered a
means of securing political stability, a means to prevent the
domination of the region by a hostile power and a means by
which security cooperation can be promoted throughout the
Middle East and North Africa.
The promotion of democracy has been considered by
many as necessary because it "worked" for the U.S. But
theorists and poll: iakers must recognize that modern
international relations requires cross culture interpretation
as values of one society can clash with the values of another.
Cultural bias' as differences do exist between Western and
Muslim cultures and although democracy may be proven, it may
not be compatible with Middle East and North African
countries. Larry Diamond states:
65
Promoting democracy does not mean exporting
it .... Nor can Americans impose a preference for
democracy where it does not exist. Rather, promoting
democracy means offering moral, political, diplomatic,
and financial support to individuals and organizations
that are struggling to open up authoritarian
regimes .... [Ref 67, pg. 271
As the former Soviet Union was viewed as the "evil
empire," so to have the Muslims, in particular the Islamic
fundamentalists, been closely identified with terrorism and
global unrest. Farhang states that:
During the cold war Washington tended to see pro-
Soviet conspirators as the only serious challenge to
the traditional regimes in the Middle East. The
Iranian revolution shattered this view and produced
the temptation to make Islamic fundamentalism rather
than communism the principal threat to Western
interests in the region. [Ref 15, pg. 11
The Muslim world has not had the solid foundation
that the U.S. has had to foster governmental institutions and
is often times considered to be antidemocratic due to their
lack of support for the political liberalization of the West.
On the other hand, this perception can be considered
reflective of the lack of understanding by the West of the
cultural differences which is contrary to the principle of
open mindedness as the essence of democracy. But yet, as
pointed out by James Schlesinger, the one Islamic state that
has had the most successful process toward democracy is Iran.
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But the U.S. has not held Iran in higher regard or entered
into closer U.S./Iranian relations than any of the other
states in the region. [Ref 68, pg. 20]
b. Promotion Of Free Markets
The promotion of free markets is viewed as a
mechanism through which the U.S. can encourage other countries
to open their economies and expand the opportunities for
trade, bring stabilization to the region, improve the quality
of life and create new trade markets for the U.S. The
attributes of free markets are free trade and free flows of
investment. Charles Schotta states:
Free investment flows complement and reinforce
free-trade because comparative advantage can be
financed from a larger pool of savings. Capital is a
critically important factor of production and is
scarce. If free to move to be utilized where it makes
its greatest contribution to output, ... economic output
will be maximized for a given amount of capital. When
capital is not free, total global output inevitably
will be lower than it could otherwise be. [Ref 69, pg
561
Economic liberation through free markets is
thought to be a means by which democracy, through increased
economic development and trade exchange, enables a break-down
of ethnic barriers and opens borders to trade. Market-
oriented economies therefore imply the fostering of democracy.
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B. HUMAN RIGHTS
The promotion of democracy is predicated on the notion
that democracies are more likely to view conflicts with
compromise and accommodation and that democracies answer to
their own citizens. Recognition of human rights then can be
considered a precondition to and a principle of democracy.
The technology of television has brought pictures of
battling factions and starving Somalis, victims of the ethnic
cleansing and genocide of Bosnia, the plight of the Kurds
during the Gulf War and other peoples drive for self-
determination and sovereignty such as the Palestinians into
every household propelling the issue of human rights into the
arena of U.S. policy. Still as horrible and absurd are the
incidents which have not received "CNN coverage" such as the
thousands of political prisoners that Syrian President Asad
has killed or the entire city and population of over 30
thousand people that were completely destroyed. [Ref 70, pp.
76-105]
During the Cold War the U.S. seemed ready to collaborate
with any regime that accommodated it, regardless of how the
regime ruled or treated its own people as containment of the
Soviet Union was the priority. As evidenced by the ethnic
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violence and human rights abuses which have tainted the
present world order, it is apparent that a lack of respect for
and recognition of human rights exists and that such
negligence directly contributes to post Cold War unrest. This
lack of recognition therefore elevates the responsibility of
human rights as a U.S. interest to the level of the Department
of Defense because of probably political consequences where,
particularly in the Middle East, repression has become an
alternative to Islamic fundamentalism. Human rights therefore
has become a new part of the status quo of U.S. foreign
policy. Farhang states that:
Dictatorship is at the root of instability and
violence ia the Middle East.. .The most obvious and
urgent place to begin a departure from the past
practices is in the area of human rights. [Ref 15,
pg. 41
With national borders becoming less constraining however,
as suggested by Robert Cullen, the U.S. needs to redefine
collective rights, that is the right of self-determination and
non-interference by external actors and that of individual
freedoms and choices. The former Soviet republics have
demonstrated that the U.S. position to promote democracy can
also exacerbate claims to collective rights while at the same
time foster abuses in individual rights. [Ref 71, pg.80]
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This awkward situation can also be seen in Iraq where U.S.
support for Kurdish self-determination was highlighted by
blatant violations of individual human rights while U.S.
actions can be interpreted as having "turned cheek." This
type of action, as does the continuance of economic and
military aid to countries with reported human rights
violations, tends to send conflicting messages to non-
democratic countries of the intent of U.S. foreign policy
causing a loss in creditability of the U.S. and negates any
pro-democratic potential. Just as human rights have been
propelled into U.S. foreign policy as a result of mass media
and public awareness, so to do inconsistencies in diplomacy
create symbols of double standards which negate the potential
for transitions to democracy.
C. RELATIONSHIP WITH NON-DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS
As Doyle suggests that democratic societies are less
likely to go to war with each other, it would then seem
reasonable that non-democratic countries would pose the
greatest concern to U.S. interests in the post Cold War
environment as suggested by Huntington [Ref 5, pg. 194].
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In the Middle East authority is based on "intimidation,
subjugation and cooptation" and it can be reasoned that
aggression by authoritarian governments against others, if
given the opportunity and power, is expected. Therefore
regional conflicts will be ever present in the post-Cold War
environment. [Ref 72, pg. 14]
Justified by the Cold War ideology, overt and often times
covert interventions were engaged and rationalized as
legitimate due to concern that non-democratic countries would
ally with the Soviet Union as the major adversary. The post
Cold World environment however can allow for an authoritarian
rulers principles to turn against themselves as a result of
the attributes of global media coverage, the role of external
actors whose policies support democratic development and the
need for increased economic conditions. A desire for
democratic reform from within spems to be paramount to the
success of democracy.
A defense posture for democratic countries toward non-
democratic countries therefore requires readiness by all
democratic states and multilateral agreements which share
responsibly for global order focusing on a consistent program
of foreign aid as a tool of intervention to foster human
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rights and good governmental practices. Covert involvement
should be avoided as this type of action allows for blame to
be placed on external actors when things go wrong. People's
frustrations are then turned against a perceived external
enemy thereby bolstering the legitimacy of the authoritarian
regime rather than allowing the focus of their attention to be
directed at the source of their conflict which in fact is the
authoritarian regime.
D. FOREIGN AID PROGRAM
U.S. foreign aid can be a powerful political tool if used
effectively. From past experience, foreign aid can be viewed
as an interventionist tool because not only has it been used
to promote economic growth and provide humanitarian relief but
it also has promoted regional economic, social and political
stability. During the Cold War foreign aid was viewed as a
means of stabilizing social unrest by strengthening incumbent
regimes, preventing insurgency and Soviet expansion thereby
advancing U.S. security interests. Most importantly, foreign
aid programs have been used to gain political influence for
the U.S. as a less intrusive means of reshaping global order.
(Ref 73, pp. 80-821
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The issue as to whether or not foreign aid is useful is
without challenge but whether or not foreign aid is used
appropriately appears paramount in the post Cold War era.
U.S. interests not only include the promotion of democracy,
free markets, human rights and political stability but the
internatio.tal environment has also changed to include common
interests such as the need to restart economic growth in
developing countries, to eliminate poverty worldwide, to
sustain the earth's environment and to promote open political
systems. (Ref 74, pp. 182]
What appears wasteful and hypocritical to U.S. foreigr aid
program is what appears to be favoritism toward some countries
and the continuance of foreign aid, in any form, to corrupt
and abusive regimes whose governments cling to
authoritarianism and boost of democratic reform. Examples of
such oversiqht include Israel and Egypt. Israel claims to be
democratic for Jews but appears not to be committed to holding
the same freedoms of democracy to the Arabs. Egypt, as the
second largest recipient of U.S. economic and military aid, is
reported to have resorted to physical and psychological
torture during the timeframe that security and political
suspects were being held in incommunicado detention [Ref 75].
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This type of practice not only fosters images of the U.S. as
being imperialist and a country which practices double




In the post Cold War environment the four basic concepts
of security, bipolarity, bipolar rivalry and superpower
alliances no longer completely define U.S. international
relations and external issues. The previous alliance system
to support superpower objectives has been replaced by the
factors of global economic competition where the dollar has
become the basis for all transactions and political stability
has become the attraction of international investment.
Democratic declarations are viewed as a means by which
political stability can be assured. However, such
declarations are not necessarily reflective of the actual
practices within a country. The two factors of contestation
and economic development provide insight to the extent of
democratic reform within Tunisia under Ben Ali and support the
hypothesis that democracy can be used as window dressing.
The government of President Ben Ali closely parallels that
of Bourguiba in that both governments had/have a proclaimed
democratic content; both have used the Islamic sentiment of
the country to initially harness popular support; both have
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instituted measures to restructure the role of Islam in
Tunisia through the Personal Status Code and The National
Pact; both have tried to deal with the rise of Islamic
sentiment as a solution to the economic and political ills of
the country and both have denied political recognition of the
Islamic movement. Both government's, despite some political
and economic reforms, have in essence simply replaced the
former colonial powers and both have had their legitimacy
challenged economically and politically. In many respects
these challenges have caused a catch 22 in that either
economically or politically their regimes lose legitimacy
based on their performance which is the only justification for
holding power.
Bourguiba's government has been described as a modern
administrative dictatorship where the ruling party has
dominated virtually all aspects of social and political life
in Tunisia. Ben Ali's government in comparison, where simply
the name of the ruling party was changed, can be described as
an authoritarian regime in practice due to the limited and
controlled pluralism of political thinking, expression,
organization and action that is allowed within the country
[Ref 76, pg. 229]. Ben Ali boasts of a multiparty legislature
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and political pluralism although in practice this seems
unlikely simply due to the governments criteria for and
control over the political parties. Huntington states:
... a system is undemocratic to the extent that no
opposition is permitted in elections, or that the
opposition is curbed or harassed in what it can do, or
that opposition newspapers are censored or closed
down, or that votes are manipulated or miscounted.
(Ref 10, pp. 7-81
Although the National Pact established criteria of and
conduct for political parties and multi-party political
participation is proclaimed, as suggested by Lisa Anderson, it
is not participation that underlines democracy but rather
contestation [Ref 16, pg. 259). Ben Ali may have changed the
constitution to delete the provision of the presidency for
life but with the ruling party in control of the country, he
is assured reelection to the maximum three five year
consecutive terms as president. Huntington states:
The probability of stable democracy emerging will
be enhanced to the extent that the transition can be
a gradual one, that the introduction of contestation
precedes the expansion of political participation, and
that the role of violence in the transition is
minimized. The probability of democratization
decreases sharply to the extent that political life in
a society becomes highly polarized and involves
violent conflict between social forces. [Ref 5, pp.
214-215]
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The violence, social unrest and non-recognition of the
Islamic movement as a political party of both governments
underlines the lack of government contestation. If democracy
is a matter of power distribution as suggested by Rueschemeyer
and if a strong middle class is needed to foster democracy,
the monopoly of the ruling party needs to be broken. During
the 1980's, the Tunisian Islamic movement was comprised mainly
of the lower classes and the secular opposition groups were
comprised largely of the middle and upper-middle classes [Ref
31, pg. 90]. Although the middle classes prospered under
Bourguiba, they were reportedly unhappy with the absence of a
fully democratic regime [Ref 31, pg. 90]. If, as suggested by
Farhang, a functional alliance existed between the middle
classes and the urban poor or lower-middle classes, the
strength of the middle class would in essence lie within the
al-Nahda and this combined force could bring about the avenue
toward true democratic reform. [Ref 15, pg. 3]
As apparent in Ben Ali's interpretation of democracy which
is based on majority representation rather than proportional
representation, democracy is understood as collective
participation rather than a political mechanism to allow for
individual liberties and political rights of belief,
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expression and dissent. [Ref 16, pp. 259-260] Government
contestation can be considered a true reflection of a
democratic government with the ideal of government of the
people, for the people and by the people. Democracy cannot
occur without separation of power. Lack of contestation is
also the definitive of an authoritarian government.
Economically, Tunisia's high level of unemployment, lack
of education and although not a direct factor, high ratio of
imports has contributed to Tunisia's dependence on European
and Western trade and investment which is paramount to the
country's livelihood. Both Huntington and Rueschemeyer
propose that economic democracy or a market economy are the
most promising means to achieve formal democracy. Although
free markets are perceived to foster democracy, democracy is
a political system rather than a social and economic system.
Huntington cautions that free markets do not guarantee
democracy. Specifically:
... economic development produces a phase in a
nation's history where political elites and the
prevailing political values can shape choices that
decisively determine the nation's future evolution...
Economic development compels the modification or
abandonment of traditional political institutions; it
does nc' determine what political system will replace
them. (Ref 5, pp. 201-202]
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Tunisia cannot risk a perception from the U.S. or Europe
that it is an unreliable ally which would break the confidence
barrier needed to foster foreign investment. Accordingly, the
proclamation of democracy by President Ben Ali is in the best
interests of the country as a means to gain good standings
both politically and economically with Western nations, the
IMF and the World Bank to ensure continued economic investment
and not to be left behind in the changing global environment.
The AMU is a prime example of this concern as in a world where
regional trading blocks are developing, poorer countries will
have a more difficult task of integration and shared economic
growth with regional neighbors because their previous economic
prosperity has been linked to either the West or Europe [Ref
60].
In essence Ben Ali, having personally experienced the
challenges of Bourguiba, elected to gamble on the
proclamations of democracy to legitimize his rule and to
foster foreign investment and economic aid. This proclamation
of democracy would give an illusion of political stability and
a means by which his regime can survive and foster legitimacy
and thereby not allow an economic crisis to be an opening for
a revived Islamic movement and governmental overthrow as was
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the case of Bourguiba. In other words, a healthy growing
economy would in essence reduce the appeal of extremist
groups; the Islamic movement in Tunisia as seen by Ben Ali.
The importance however is that, as suggested by Huntington,
economic growth alone will not lead to the success of
democracy.
The political declarations of Ben Ali presents U.S. policy
makers with several challenges. 1) Countries that are
dependent on foreign investment make it difficult to
effectively use the policy tool of economic sanctions. Not
all investing countries will electively support sanctions as
not only does it effect the country against which sanctions
are imposed but it also hinders the economic lines of those
investing countries. 2) If the goal of U.S. policy toward
Tunisia is to maintain stability, then support of Ben Ali's
government regardless of its practices is in keeping with this
goal. This in turn creates the image of double standards in
U.S. foreign policy and promotes the concept of Western
imperialism. 3) If the promotion of democracy in principle is
the objective, then true democratic practices risk the
possibility of intolerant, anti-American government assuming
power. As previously addressed, democracy is not complex
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formulas for governance and political participation but rather
a set of processes and social forces that culminate into
individual freedoms and choices. The concept of Western
individual freedoms owes much to the American Bill of Rights
where such freedoms as the freedom of religion, the freedom of
speech and press, and the freedom of discrimination on the
basis of race creed or sex have become the pillars of American
democracy. If the Western concept of individual freedoms is
applied to the Middle East then it stands to reason that the
freedoms and choices include the freedom to be pro-Islamic,
anti-American and even anti-democratic with preference to
political culture. It also implies the respect for the
fundamental principles of freedom from torture and arbitrary
arrest, the right to due process of law and the rights of
ethnic and religious minorities.
Every political system rests on a culture system and every
culture system rests on that societies experiences and values.
It is the people themselves who will determine whether
democratic systems will be established and whether they will
survive. Tunisia's importance to the U.S. is that of
political stability. Tunisia represents a unique opportunity
for the creation of a democratic Islamic government should Ben
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Ali give the Islamic movement a recognized political voice.
Although the recent unrest in Algeria makes this possibility
all the more unlikely, movement on a true democratic path
regardless of economic progress will not occur until such
political factors are addressed.
In the post Cold War environment where the issue of human
rights has become a U.S. interest, perhaps the emphasis of
U.S. foreign policy should be that of good governmental
practices which recognize individual freedoms rather than
democratic reform. This in turn would preclude the use of
democracy as window dressing, project clear U.S. policy
intentions and deter the perception of Western imperialism.
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APPENDIX A - RECOGNIZED AND BANNED POLITICAL PARTIES
Rassemblement Constitutionnel Democratique (RCD) or
Democratic Constitutional Rally. A moderate left-wing
republican party. Formerly the Destourian Socialist Party.
Founded June 3, 1920. President Ben Ali is the chairman.
Mouvement des Democrates Socialistes (MDS) or Movement of
Socialist Democrats. Supports pluralism. Founded June 10,
1978. President is Mohamed Moaada.
Mouvement de I'Unite' Populaire (MUP). Supports radical
reform. Split into two factions. Coordinator is Brahim
Hayder.
Parti de I'Union Populaire (PUP) or Popular Unity Party.
Broke away from the MUP. Secretary General is Mohamed Belhaj
Amor.
Mouvement Ettajdid or Ettajdid Movement. Formerly the
Tunisian Communist Party. Renamed April 23, 1993. Secretary
General is Mohamed Harmel.
Union Democratique Unioniste (UDU) or Unionist Democratic
Union. Supports Arab unity. Secretary General is
Abderrahmane Tlili.
Rassemblement Socialiste Progressiste (RSP) or Progressive
Socialist Rally. A left-wing party. Founded December 13,
1983. Secretary General is Ahmed Nejib Chebbi.
Parti Social Liberal %PSL) or Liberal Social Party.
Secretary General is Mounir Beji.
Parti de la Renaissance or al-Nahda. Formerly the
Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique (MTI). Banned in 1981.
Leader is Rached Ghannouchi.
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Rassemblement National Arabe. Banned in 1981. Leader is
Bashir Assad.
(Sources: Tunisia Digest, January-February 1994; The Middle
East And North Africa 1994, Europa Publication)
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